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ate Saturday night April 17, 1943, agents from the Swedish counter-
espionage arrested a man in his thirties in central Stockholm. He was an 
ordinary industrial worker from Norrköping and had at this particular 
time visited the British legation in the fashionable area of Östermalm. 
There he had got a mysterious briefcase, which he carefully dared to open first when he 
arrived to his hotel room downtown. In the following moment, agents kicked in the 
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This article deals with an active personality in the European World War II-context, 
the Englishman and diplomat Peter Tennant. Officially, he served as press attaché 
at the British legation in Stockholm and become a popular companion in the 
capital’s conviviality with a significant social network. Unofficially, he was called 
«Karlsson» and led the Swedish section of Special Operations Executive, S.O.E. In 
this role he organized clandestine espionage and sabotage against German 
interests. This article primarily uses previously confidential archival sources from 
the civil Swedish counter-espionage to find out more about Tennant’s activities in 
Sweden during the war and what kind of spy he actually was. 
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At this time, Sweden found itself in a precarious situation. The country lay in the 
middle of a geographical field of tension, surrounded by the two heavy-armed 
superpowers U.S.S.R. in the north and east and Germany in the south and west. 
Especially from a geo-political and military perspective the country was very 
vulnerable. The combination of partly weak and obsolete armed forces with a long 
coastline and a lot of archipelagos and islands was fragile and problematic from this 
point of view. Thus the public sphere and production of news during the war was 
characterized by anxiety and rumors, and the country maintained a high level of 
military preparedness and mobilization. The Swedish authorities were working at full 
speed to cope with a passive state of war: migration, espionage, sabotage, smuggling, 
rationing, censorship, and so forth. 
Although, regarding social relations, economy and politics the Swedish society was 
in comparison rather stable. Its welfare state had started to be constructed and the 
social-reformist ideas of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal had a great impact those days. The 
social democratic Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson led a grave coalition government 
and tried together with the non-political diplomat Christian Günther, who served as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to keep an indulgent and low profile in foreign affairs. 
While the informal guiding principle was consensus outward, correction inward, the 
official Swedish policy was non-alignment and neutrality. But nevertheless, it 
concealed generous appeasement towards particularly The Third Reich due to 
historically rooted cooperation and relations in various ways1. 
With all this in mind, Sweden was during the war an important strategic outpost for 
the belligerent countries, perhaps even most for the Allies, and it developed to be a 
besieged and thrilling battleground for information and propaganda warfare, 
intelligence services and espionage: «The great powers were eager to exploit 
opportunities to damage their enemies through espionage, sabotage and counter-
intelligence operations on Swedish territory»2. Stockholm was in this matter in the eye 
of the storm. The capital of Sweden was one of few places in Europe where all 
significant intelligence services were represented during the war, it was in fact a center 
for diplomacy and espionage: «a Nordic Casablanca»3. In this context the British 
diplomat Peter Tennant (1910-1996) was a familiar face. Throughout the war he 
                                                 
1 AGRELL, Wilhelm, «Sweden and the dilemmas of neutral intelligence liaison», in The Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 29, 4/2006, pp. 633-651. 
2 GILMOUR, John, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin. The Swedish Experience in the Second 
World War, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p. 134. 
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formally served as press attaché at the British legation. Informally, he was called 
“Karlsson” and operated as leader of the British espionage and sabotage organization 
Special Operations Executive, S.O.E., in Sweden4. 
The purpose of this article is to investigate and contextualize Peter Tennant’s 
activities in Sweden during World War II, and with this primarily try to map his 
informal activities within the S.O.E. in Sweden. By this, the aim is to deepen the 
understanding of espionage and its conditions at a crucial stage in the history of 
modern warfare. Tennant’s years in Sweden have formerly been outlined to a limited 
extent and he has been described as an unreliable yet popular secret agent, surrounded 
by an aura of flamboyance, excitement and mystery5. The explorative research 
questions that arise here are thus firstly about what he actually did in Sweden and 
secondly about what kind of spy he actually was. Due to the incomplete and 
fragmentary archival situation around S.O.E. in Sweden it is though impossible to reach 
any kind of definitive answer to these questions. This methodological limitation leads 
to that the article’s results should be understood as preliminary and related to a 
forthcoming and wider research project of mine about S.O.E.’s activities in Sweden, 
where British sources will be included to a greater extent. 
From a theoretical-analytical view, this article takes a social-psychological 
approach to what espionage and spying are about. Thus, its mainly technical duties 
such as surveillance, interception, deciphering, and bargaining are deeply embedded in 
risky socio-cultural contexts in which the behavior of the spy are decisive. In this sense, 
spying is considered world’s «second oldest profession» and the core of espionage 
about accessing or gathering information secretly without the owner’s will or awareness 
in order to find clandestine knowledge and advantages in relation to its counterpart6. 
Central to spying is also activities such as misinforming and planting rumors and 
factoids that mislead and establishes false knowledge7. During the 1900s espionage and 
counter-espionage became indispensable parts of modern warfare, not least because of 
                                                 
4 FOOT, Michael Richard Daniell, «Obituary: Sir Peter Tennant», in The Independent, URL:  
< http://www.independent.co.uk/incoming/obituary-sir-peter-tennant-5585803.html > 
[consultato il 28 dicembre 2016]. 
5 AGRELL, Wilhelm, Stockholm som spioncentral, Lund, Historiska Media, 2006, pp. 70-73, 
103-105. 
6 KNIGHTLEY, Phillip, The Second Oldest Profession. Spies and spying in the twentieth 
century, London, Pimlico, 2003. 
7 FARAGO, Ladislas, War of Wits. The anatomy of espionage and intelligence, New York, Funk 
& Wagnalls Company, 1954, pp. 153-154. 
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the scope of World War II and the coming digital revolution with the completely new 
conditions of warfare that it brought8. 
 
2. Stockholm and the Swedish counter-espionage during World War 
II 
 
Stockholm’s role as an European «spy center» during World War II was reflected in 
a increasing number of foreigners and diplomats staying in the city. As an example, the 
workforce at the American legation grew from less than 10 in the beginning of the war 
to around 400 in the end. But as Ladislas Farago has pointed out, very few of the spies 
who «flocked» here were (except from the Russians who have a long tradition of being 
shamelessly interested in Sweden for military reasons) interested in Swedish 
conditions9. Instead they used Sweden and its capital as a platform for various 
confidential activities and operations both inside and outside its national borders. 
Stockholm functioned as a «staging ground and a marketplace» for espionage and 
«complicated liaison» between actors and organizations that officially not existed at 
all10. 
The main actors in this drama were all positioned in the central area of Östermalm. 
Besides the Americans (including O.S.S.) at Strandvägen 7 and the Britons (including 
S.O.E.) at Strandvägen 82, the Russians and their organizations G.R.U. and N.K.V.D. 
were housed at Villagatan 7 while the Germans ran shady business from bases in «Büro 
Wagner» at Nybrogatan 27 and in the official German legation at Hovslagargatan 2. In 
addition, the Britons had a discrete office for S.I.S. at Birger Jarlsgatan 12, camouflaged 
as a passport office. The Headquarter of Sweden’s military intelligence was a small and 
confidential organization with different and relatively autonomous subsections that had 
various and unclear tasks. It was suitably located in the middle of these blocks, in Grå 
Huset/Generalstaben (The Grey House/The General Staff) at Östermalmsgatan 8711. In 
this context, the Allied had to handle two agendas and enemies simultaneously: on one 
hand their anti-Nazi beliefs and the Germans who especially during the early war years 
                                                 
8 FARAGO, Ladislas, Burn After Reading. The Espionage of World War II, Annapolis, Naval 
Institute Press-Bluejacket Books, 2003; FERRIS, John, After the RMA: Contemporary 
Intelligence, Power and War, in KASSIMERIS, George, BUCKLEY, John (ed.), The Ashgate 
research companion to Modern Warfare, Farnham, Ashgate Publishing-Routledge, 2010. 
9 FARAGO, Ladislas, The Game of the Foxes. British and German intelligence operations and 
personalities which changed the course of the Second World War, London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1972, pp. 521-531, p. 522. 
10 AGRELL, Wilhelm, «Sweden and the dilemmas of neutral intelligence liaison», cit., pp. 637-
638.  
11 AGRELL, Wilhelm, Stockholm som spioncentral, cit., pp. 7-9. 
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advanced their positions seriously in Sweden and Scandinavia, and on the other hand 
their anti-communist strategies and the Russians who became a particularly more 
urgent threat after the turning point of the war in 1943, manifested in the Battle of 
Stalingrad and the downfall of Nazi-Germany. 
The Swedish authorities’ response to this foreign spy invasion was massive. During 
the war an enormous counter-espionage apparatus was mobilized. Aside the military 
intelligence, the Swedish counter-espionage was then mainly organized through a new 
civil security service: Allmänna Säkerhetstjänsten, A.S (the General Security Service). 
With the main aim, at least initially, to map and handle state enemies from the political 
left, this organization was inaugurated in September 1939 after initiatives that 
originated from the social democratic government and influential anti-communist 
interests within the state authorities and enterprise. The organization was directly 
subordinated the government and led by the controversial police officer Eric Hallgren: 
a notorious and heavy-handed communist-hunter and head of the criminal police in 
Stockholm during the 1920s. This peculiar origins of A.S. become logical in the light of 
a long tradition of fear of Russians, Bolsheviks, socialists and “communism” in Swedish 
political life and public sphere. 
A.S. had a character of civil pseudo-police, acting intrusively in loose legal reins and 
with an unclear relation to the regular police organization. Its operations were divided 
into three subsections: the Central Bureau that controlled and censored all kind of 
communications in society; the Surveillance Bureau that were watching and monitoring 
suspect organizations, persons or phenomena in society; and the Expedition Bureau 
that took care of administration, registration and other archival tasks. When this 
sophisticated contra-espionage organization reached its peak in 1943, it employed over 
1.000 people in different positions and had in addition a large number of listeners, 
informers and other associates on its payroll. In total, A.S. between 1939 and 1945 
opened and read 50 million items of mail, stopped over 3.000 telegrams and censored 
5.000, intercepted 11 million phone calls, and registered over 80.000 «politically 
unreliable» Swedes and foreigners12. 
When the existence of A.S. was revealed in 1943, the public indignation was severe 
and fierce critique was directed against its pliable and spineless principles. While 
Germans were treated friendly and soft, and Britons and other Allies were monitored 
hard, in the beginning of the war, the circumstances were the reverse at the end. 
Because, after the Battle of Stalingrad the Swedish counter-espionage instead became 
                                                 
12 FLYGHED, Janne, Rättsstat i kris. Spioneri och sabotage i Sverige under andra världskriget, 
Stockholm, Federativs förlag, 1992, pp. 265-322. 
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more friendly towards Britons and the Allies and more sharp towards Germans and 
their sympathizers. Nevertheless, the counter-spies within A.S. were quite successful in 
their mission to watch over unruly people and fiddly events during the war, or as John 
Gilmour puts it: «keeping the lid on a bubbling cauldron of spies and saboteurs»13. 
 
3. The amiable spy 
 
One of the persons that the Swedish counter-espionage kept an extra eye on was 
Peter Tennant. On November 1, 1939, A.S. registered that he had been enrolled at the 
British legation since September 26 when he arrived in Charlottenberg, close to the 
Norwegian border. At the same time, they noted that his wife Hellis Tennant already 
had arrived in the end of July via Helsingborg, near Elsinore in Denmark. Mr. 
Tennant’s pro-British activities immediately began to interest A.S. and beside the 
regular surveillance they in August 1940 decided to request control of his mail. A few 
weeks later, in September 1940, they started the interception of his phone, which they 
continued to do until January 17, 194514. 
Just a few days after his arrival he was interviewed by Swedish journalists and 
expressed confidence with his new assignment and trivialized the war as something he 
barely had noticed yet15. His formal duties as press attaché at the legation was to 
represent, embrace, promote and defend British interests in Sweden and to disseminate 
and collect information and news: «As my job was to promote the British cause publicly 
it was also important to know what not to promote and this meant keeping in touch 
with everybody»16. As a consequence, he during his years in Stockholm developed a 
large network of contacts with politicians, directors, policemen, civil servants, artists, 
military officers, authors, and academics. In A.S.’s mapping of this network, several 
hundred many well-known Swedes – as the liberal and anti-fascist authors, journalists 
and editors Carl Adam Nycop and Åke Tulstrup, the author and Nobel Prize-winner 
(1951) Pär Lagerkvist, and the beloved actor and artist Stig Järrel – are listed with their 
personal relationship to Tennant carefully noted17. 
                                                 
13 GILMOUR, John, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin, cit., p. 136. 
14 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Memorandum, 01-11-1939; Form, 15-08-1940 (Folder 1A); Summary, 12-03-1945 
(Folder 2A). 
15 Aftonbladet, 29 September 1939. 
16 TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, Hull, The University of Hull Press, 1992, p. 58. 
17 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Name lists, undated (Folder 2A). 
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With his solid middle-class background – born and raised in Hoddesdon, 
Hertfordshire, and academically specialized in Scandinavian societies and languages at 
Marlborough, Cambridge and Queens – Tennant easily established as a distinguished 
and socially competent gentleman in the public sphere and conviviality of Stockholm. 
He often made great impression with his fluent and flawless Swedish and imitations of 
different regional accents. A recurring and popular event that he arranged was well-
attended press evenings at the British Legation. Here he, in front of an audience of 
invited journalists and various anglophiles from the cultural elite, told news in his way 
and announced Britain’s view on the war and the world. 
Beside this, he was also engaged in other, more confidential boyish pranks from the 
current spy handbook18. Spreading itching powder at Grand Hotel, in high-ranked 
German military officers underwear was one of them19. A second was to send fake 
announcements and meeting invitations to Swedish Nazi-sympathizers. A third was to 
mass-produce 50 000 falsified German stamps, picturing the Gestapo chief Himmler 
instead of Reich Chancellor Hitler, and use them to post «black propaganda» with 
faked war-news around Germany. A fourth was to spread false rumors and 
disinformation among pro-German Swedes about the Allies preparing a forthcoming 
embarkation with troops on Norway’s west coast. This was a part of the comprehensive 
and successful transnational operations Graffham and Fortitude 2 that deceived the 
Germans to retain troops in Norway and therefore made the invasion of Normandy in 
June 1944 possible20. 
While all this aimed to confuse, demoralize and mislead, Tennant also acted in 
other ways behind the scene. In this he built close and useful relations with key persons 
at important positions in the Swedish society. One of those was the world famous and 
legendary Swedish criminal investigator and forensic specialist Harry Söderman, in the 
history books most known as “Revolver-Harry”. He had by his central position in 
International Criminal Police Commission (I.C.P.C., from 1956 Icpo-Interpol) a broad 
international network, including the Gestapo-leadership in Berlin as well as the 
Scotland Yard in London. Among many things, he was during the war leading the 
education of an extensive paramilitary Norwegian resistance-troop on Swedish 
                                                 
18 RIGDEN, Denis, How To Be A Spy. The World War II SOE Training Manual, Toronto, The 
Dundurn Group, 2004. 
19 In the manual for S.O.E.-agents, the use of this rather effective itching powder, made from 
«tiny seed hairs» is explained: RIGDEN, Denis, How To Be A Spy, cit.p. 24. 
20 Dagens Nyheter, 1 October 1989; TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, cit., pp. 34-35. 
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territory, «polititroppene», that soon consisted of 15.000 insurgents with a lot of heavy 
weapons and vehicles21. 
Tennant and Söderman apparently reached a near relation. They shared deep pro-
Allied interests and combined behind their formal duties as an «odd duo» business 
with pleasure22, not least when it came to food and beverages: «He became a close 
friend, a sailing companion on my boat Valkyrian and an eating, drinking and singing 
gastronome»23. Of course it was a notable advantage for S.O.E. that their man in 
Stockholm were socializing in private with the head of the Criminal Technical Institute 
of Sweden. And with a concise but cryptic formulation, which probably contains a lot of 
untold information, Tennant afterwards underlined that Söderman throughout the war 
was a «friend and ally for whose solid support we were most grateful»24. What is not 
mentioned here is that it actually was Harry Söderman who was responsible for the 
criminal technical investigations that followed some of the sabotage actions that took 
place in Sweden during the war, and which S.O.E. were considerably suspected to have 
organized. 
Another person that Tennant developed a significant connection to was the 
influential businessman and weapon-dealer John Helge Walter. He had built a fortune 
selling American can openers to the Swedish army and was when the war broke out 
enlisted as negotiator and courier by the Swedish government with the task to buy new 
modern destroyers from Italy to the outdated Swedish Navy. However, the whole affair 
ended up in diplomatic jumble when the destroyers were seized in June 1940 near the 
Faeroes by the British Navy on their way from La Spezia to Gothenburg25, and in 
springtime 1943 Walter was sentenced to penal servitude for espionage. According to 
the Swedish counter-espionage, he had forewarned Tennant about the upcoming, 
secret and intricate destroyer-affair and even leaked information to him about 
classified discussions inside the parliamentary Foreign Policy Council 
(Utrikesnämnden)26. In the interrogations, Walter saw Tennant as a nice but rather 
shallow acquaintance that he had met in some cocktail parties at the home of his close 
                                                 
21 JOHANSSON, Anders, Den glömda armén. Sverige-Norge 1939-1945, Stockholm, Fisher & 
Co., 2008, pp. 58-75; SÖDERMAN, Harry, Skandinaviskt mellanspel. Norska och danska 
trupper i Sverige, Stockholm, Forum, 1945, pp. 102-127; TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, 
cit., pp. 166-173. 
22 JOHANSSON, Anders, Den glömda armén, cit., p. 61 (quotation, my translation). 
23 TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, cit. p. 163. 
24 Ibidem, p. 162. 
25 GILMOUR, John, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin, cit., pp. 215-216. 
26 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Interception protocol, 01-04-1941; Interception protocol, 19-03-1941; Interrogation 
report, 19-12-1942 (Folder 1A). 
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friend, countess Amelie Posse-Brázdová – whom he in 1938 had helped escape from 
Czechoslovakia to Sweden after the Nazi occupation and whose son he had helped 
escape to England after killing a Nazi in Stockholm’s docklands27. 
A third influential person that Tennant developed a close relationship to was the 
already named Amelie Posse-Brázdová. She played a political key role in the anglophile 
and pro-Allied Swedish opposition to Nazism and the Third Reich. During the war 
years, she was a loud and well-known anti-fascist debater in Sweden and an intellectual 
and cultural personality with many significant contacts in the upper political 
establishment. She lived an eventful life, married the Czech artist Oskar Brázda in 1915, 
become a friend of the first president of Czechoslovakia, Tomás Garrigue Masaryk, and 
was beside her anfi-fascist beliefs even eagerly dedicated in the striving for 
Czechoslovakian independence28. On a personal level she was godmother of Tennant’s 
children and described him heartily as: a «talented and adorable» man who «whole 
Stockholm, specifically its artistic and intellectual world, communed with». Their own 
relation she declared as based on «mutual sympathy» with «dangerous and dubious 
things behind […]»29. It was also she that came up with the idea to mask Walter’s and 
Tennant’s identities as (initially alternately) “Pilqvist” and “Karlsson” in order to 
confuse the A.S.-agents30. 
Obviously, Tennant was very popular and gracious, and extraordinary successful in 
building close human relations. This makes sense in the light of Carson Eoyang’s 
analyses of espionage as «a complex and elaborate pattern of linked behaviors»31. Thus, 
appearing harmless, trustworthy and amiable as a spy, could be about to set up classical 
honey traps, using sexual devotion to deceive, disarm, and access information, but is 
essentially a matter of ingratiation which Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow have pointed 
out as one fundamental dimension of espionage: «[…] in order to make favorable 
impressions on someone whose approval is desired»32. To sum up, amiability in this 
                                                 
27 TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, cit., pp. 74-75, 229-251. Swedish National Archive, the 
Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file (P1596): Interrogation report, 
02/04-12-1942 (Folder 1A). 
28 STRÖMBERG KRANTZ, Eva, En ande som hör jorden till. En bok om Amelie Posse, 
Stockholm, Carlsson, 2010. 
29 POSSE, Amelie, Åtskilligt kan nu sägas, Stockholm, Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur, 1949, p. 
337 (quotation, my translation); TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, cit., pp. 73-78. 
30 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Memorandum about Karlsson, 20-03-1941 (Folder 1A). 
31 EOYANG, Carson, Models of Espionage, in SARBIN, Theodore R., CARNEY, Ralph M., 
EOYANG, Carson (ed.), Citizen Espionage. Studies in Trust and Betrayal, Westport 
(Connecticut), Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 85. 
32 TAYLOR, Stan A., SNOW, Daniel, «Cold war spies: Why they spied and how they got caught», 
in Intelligence and National Security, 12, 2/1997, pp. 101-125, p. 106. 
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sense is crucial for a spy of Tennant’s kind, a spy with the masculine strategy to seduce 
and bind other person’s wishes and to create desire for cooperation and connection33. 
 
4. Sabotage, stay-behind and other underground activities  
 
Peter Tennant’s primary pursuit in Stockholm during the war was actually not his 
duty as press attaché. His sharp mission was instead – recruited by Charles Hambro 
and in the beginning together with Malcolm Munthe – to organize S.O.E. in 
Scandinavia. According to Max Hastings, S.O.E. was originally about a new kind of 
secret war – «a new kind of war with new men and new means» – with guerilla 
warfare, sabotage, burglary, vandalism, assassinations and other forms of resistance 
towards Germany all over Europe. The initiative behind S.O.E. was carefully considered 
by Prime Minister Churchill and based on some clear and distinct objectives with focus 
on making «mayhem across Europe» – or as Churchill himself expressed this: «to set 
Europe ablaze»34. 
S.O.E. started its transnational activities in July 1940 and in October their 
ambitions in Scandinavia was straightened when Tennant was appointed to lead its 
three main activities: subversive propaganda (SO 1), subversive warfare (SO 2), and 
overt propaganda (MOI)35. According to Tennant, they recruited «safe-breakers, 
forgers and other splendid representatives of the criminal classes» as well as «lawyers, 
merchant bankers and dons»36. Their activities were thus rather multifaceted and 
inventive, but according to Hastings anyway «more effective» than S.I.S./MI6 and 
driven «by abler people»37. 
Since the Swedish neutrality policy allowed extensive German train and sea 
transports of commodities, war equipment and troops through Sweden, one of two 
main tasks for S.O.E. was to sabotage and destroy German interests and support 
                                                 
33 CALÁS, Marta B., SMIRCICH, Linda, «Voicing Seduction to Silence Leadership», in 
Organization Studies, 12, 4/1991, pp. 567-602. 
34 HASTINGS, Max, The Secret War. Spies, Codes and Guerillas 1939-45, London, William 
Collins, 2016, pp. 260-264, quotations pp. 261, 264. About the fundamentals and organization 
of S.O.E. se also: FOOT, M.R.D., SOE. An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 
1940-1946, London, The Bodley Head, 2014, pp. 1-20; JEFFERY, Keith, The Secret History of 
MI6, New York, The Penguin Press, 2010, pp. 352-358; STAFFORD, David, Britain and 
European Resistance, 1940-1945. A survey of the Special Operations Executive, with 
Documents, London, Thistle Publishing, 2013, pp. 238-239. 
35 CRUICKSHANK, Charles, S O E in Scandinavia, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 
1986, p. 61. 
36 TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, cit., p. 146. 
37 BOYCE, Fredric, EVERETT, Douglas, SOE. The scientific secrets, Stroud, The History Press, 
2009, pp. 69-88; HASTINGS, Max, The Secret War, cit., p. 261. 
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functions on Swedish territory. So, despite that S.O.E. in Sweden as well as elsewhere 
officially didn’t even exist, it soon started to happen violent things: 
 
 April 17, 1941: a bomb attack at Gudå train station, near Meråker in Norway, 
close to the border between Sweden and Norway. This attack was a part of 
Operation Barbara but failed completely. Instead of a big German transport 
train, the target became a small Norwegian railcar that happened to be in the 
way. The unsuspecting Norwegians inside were injured by shattered glass but 
survived fortunately. This was a fiasco for both S.O.E. and Scandinavian 
resistance and was concealed in darkness38. 
 July 19, 1941: a bomb attack against a transport train at the Station in Krylbo in 
the landscape Dalarna in central Sweden. The train had 59 wagons on its way 
from Charlottenberg to Torneå in northern Finland, carrying German 
ammunition, field kitchens, cannons, gasoline, and office supplies. The 
devastation at the railyard was apocalyptic but like a miracle (or an intention?) 
only 13 persons were lightly injured since the explosion took place at five o’clock 
in the morning. In the following investigation, Harry Söderman argued that a 
sabotage could be excluded – «not even a hypothesis» – and that the underlying 
cause probably was an accident due to overheating39. 
 September 17, 1941: a bomb attack against the three Swedish destroyers HMS 
Göteborg, HMS Klas Uggla and HMS Klas Horn, anchored in Hårsfjärden, in 
the south archipelago of Stockholm. All of them sank and Klas Uggla was totally 
destroyed. 33 persons died, both officers and conscripts, and 17 persons were 
heavily injured. What actually took place has never been thoroughly 
investigated or illuminated. The Navy Headquarters’ secret inquiry, most based 
on hypotheses and interrogation of contradictory eyewitnesses, does not 
actually clarify anything40.  
 
Tennant and his S.O.E.-colleagues, the Britons Malcolm Munthe, George Binney 
and Henry McLeod Threlfall, have in various contexts been pointed out as responsible 
here, but they have never, and that is important to emphasize, been officially proven or 
                                                 
38 CRUICKSHANK, Charles, S O E in Scandinavia, cit., p. 191. 
39 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Incident-file «The Krylbo-
Catastrophe» (IC2r): Investigation report, 28-07-1941, p. 9 (quotation, my translation),  
(Supplement). MUNTHE, Malcolm, I krig är allt tillåtet. Som sabotör i Finland, Norge och 
Sverige, Stockholm, Lars Hökerbergs Bokförlag, 1954, pp. 205-209. 
40 Swedish National War Archive, the Archive of the Navy Headquarter, the Operation Division, 
Series F II, Documents regarding the Destroyer Accident 1941, volume 3. 
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sentenced. Nevertheless, they were undoubtedly the ones who had the greatest interest, 
expertise and capacity to carry out these operations. The Allies, and particularly the 
Britons, were very annoyed by and concerned that the Germans transported troops and 
weapons through Sweden, and not at least that the Swedish Navy escorted German 
freighters and warships on their seaway to Finland and Norway. A weakening of the 
Swedish fleet thus also was an indirect weakening of the German41. 
Beside this, British agents with connections to S.I.S./M.I.6. were also involved in 
the awkward «Rickman-affair» a year before, when the plan to blow up the important 
iron shipping harbor in Oxelösund failed. In retrospect Tennant declared his innocence 
and meant that they hadn’t failed if he had participated42. A year after, in the summer 
1942, the likewise embarrassing «Blackman-affair» was unveiled. Agent Threlfall then 
had equipped and instructed the dubious Swedish sailor, and previously sentenced 
violent criminal, Ivan Blackman to place firebombs on German ships in Gothenburg 
and to blow up the floodgates of the Kiel Canal. Even this plan failed and all involved 
were arrested, all except Threlfall43. The Swedish counter-espionage traced Tennant’s 
involvement in this through persistent shadowing when A.S.-agents eavesdropped on 
Tennant and Threlfall when they were having dinner at the famous restaurant Bacchi 
Wapen in Gamla Stan in Stockholm, late evening February 23, 194244. 
The other of the two main tasks for S.O.E. in Sweden during the war years was to 
build up and organize a clandestine stay-behind network of trustworthy Swedes. In 
case of a German occupation, this should operate as the backbone of a decentralized 
resistance network. A central figure in this was Amelie Posse-Brázdová. In April 1940, 
at the same time when Germany attacked Denmark and Norway, she founded the 
(actually not so) secret anti-Nazi association the Tuesday Club (Tisdagsklubbeln) in 
Stockholm, where the cultural elite met every Tuesday to channel their indignation 
about the Sweden’s pro-German foreign policy. Here, also Tennant showed up «by 
accident» at the first constituting meeting45. 
                                                 
41 FLYGHED, Janne, Rättsstat i kris, cit., pp. 414-416. 
42 Dagens Nyheter, 1 October 1989; CRUICKSHANK, Charles, S O E in Scandinavia, cit., pp. 
33-43; TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, cit., pp. 126-132. 
43 FORSBERG, Tore, Spioner och spioner som spionerar på spioner. Spioner och kontraspioner 
i Sverige, Stockholm, Hjalmarsson & Högberg Bokförlag, 2003, pp. 148-149; MEURLING, Per, 
Spionage och sabotage i Sverige, Stockholm, Lindfors Bokförlag, 1952, pp. 176-182. 
44 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Memorandum about monitoring of Threlfall, Tennant and Taub et al, 23-02-1942, p. 
2, 4 (Folder 1A). 
45 GILMOUR, John, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin, cit., p. 141; TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines 
of War, cit., pp. 76-82, p. 76. 
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According to the Swedish counter-espionage, Posse-Brázdová and her fellows were 
primarily a harmless gathering of confused middle-class antifascists with embarrassing 
attitudes46. But through mapping their activities, A.S. could trace and unravel a much 
more severe tangle: a network on the shadow side of the club with active syndicalists 
and political refugees from Czechoslovakia and Norway in the core and the radical 
social democrat K.E.G.J. from Norrköping in the center47. As initially mentioned he was 
arrested April 17, 1943, in Hotell Blå Bandet at Mäster Samuelsgatan 68 in central 
Stockholm. In his mysterious briefcase the door-kicking agents from A.S. found: «pro-
Allied propaganda, a battery, a radio transmitter, a circuit diagram, a key and a 
headphone»48. The next day, totally 23 persons were simultaneously arrested in eight 
cities around Sweden and in the subsequent investigation a complex pattern emerged. 
In this, the extent of Tennant’s role was not really clarified even if he nevertheless 
appeared as the mastermind. For example, he besides the briefcase also had given to 
K.E.G.J. a secret encryption key: 
 
The(1) owl(2) a the(4) pussy(5) cat(6) went(7) to(8) sea(9) in(10) a(11) 
beautiful(12) sea(13) green(14) boat(15) with(16) lots(17) of(18) honey(19) and(20) 
plenty(21) of(22) money(23) wrapped(24) up(25) in(26)49. 
 
K.E.G.J. had no idea why the third word was uncompleted and lacked a number. He 
neither knew how to use this nor the content of the briefcase. His connection with 
Tennant and the British Legation was strictly about his trip to England and a labor 
union event. But according to the interrogation with Posse-Brázdová, who said she 
wasn’t at all familiar with any syndicalists, she and Tennant had discussed the idea of a 
stay-behind organization with radio transmitters already in 1941, and then Tennant had 
promised both financial and technical support – and a discrete hideaway at his vessel 
Valkyrian somewhere in the archipelago of Stockholm50. 
                                                 
46 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Amelie Posse-Brazdova’s 
personal file (vol. 595, P2144): Memorandum/Meeting summary, 23-04-1943, p. 2 (Folder 6). 
47 K.E.G.J. is the person’s name initials. Due to ethical considerations, I do anonymize his 
identity here. 
48 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Memorandum about an organization…, 21-05-1943, pp. 65-66 (quotation, my 
translation), (Folder 1R). 
49 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Memorandum about an organization…, 21-05-1943, p. 63 (quotation), (Folder 1R). 
50 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Memorandum about an organization…, 21-05-1943, pp. 84-85 (Folder 1R). Se also: 
CRUICKSHANK, Charles, S O E in Scandinavia, cit., pp. 59-68. 
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In June 1943, the Court in Stockholm sentenced K.E.G.J. to two months in prison 
with three years probation for illegal holding of radio equipment. He admitted holding 
but denied any involvement in espionage or conspiracies. Neither Tennant nor Posse-
Brázdová he claimed to know well or trust51. The actual extent of this espionage 
network is unclear. How many radio transmitters Tennant had the opportunity to hand 
out and to whom, or how many operators that were instructed and prepared in 
K.E.G.J.’s and Posse-Brázdová’s network, is hard to know. However, it became clear 
that the activities foremost were ran by syndicalists and political refugees – but notably 
not any communists. As David Stafford points out, anti-communism became an 
increasingly important part of S.O.E.’s guiding principles: «SOE was an ideological as 
well as a strategic force»52. First and foremost this anti-communism had more to do 
with the upcoming Cold War, and the competition between the intelligence services of 
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., and less to do with communists as truly subversive and dangerous 
elements. Therefore, it was probably not a coincidence that Tennant, despite that 
communists were the most active and eager anti-fascists and anti-Germans, primarily 
tied syndicalists to himself and engaged them in his stay-behind network. Their feature 
as very reliable both anti-fascists and anti-communists, probably suited Tennant, 





Peter Tennant stayed with his family in Stockholm until March 1945. Then he was 
reluctantly relocated to Paris and installed as Information Counselor: «In a way it was 
sad not to be in at the kill in Sweden with the defeat of the Nazis together with that 
select band of old friends». But he was anyway pleased and confident in his and 
S.O.E.’s achievements: «Our activities played no small part in building up a spirit of 
resistance to Nazi domination»53. Short before the farewell, he posed smiling together 
with his wife in Swedish newspapers, taking goodbye and being honored as the best and 
most popular foreign diplomat in Sweden ever54. 
                                                 
51 Swedish National Archive, the Archive of the Security Police, Peter Tennant’s personal file 
(P1596): Protocol Extract, Stockholm Court, 30-06-1943; Interrogation protocol, 18-04-1943, 
p. 8 (Folder 1A).  
52 STAFFORD, David, Britain and European Resistance, cit., p. 244. 
53 TENNANT, Peter, Touchlines of War, cit., pp. 270, 272 (quotations). 
54 E.g. Expressen, 6 February 1945. 
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Whatever the case, he undoubtedly put deep imprints in Sweden – in different 
ways. On one hand, he was an ingenious networker where the friendship with 
“Revolver-Harry” is extraordinary notable. On the other hand, he was a cunning 
chameleon who very likely was involved in shady and illegal activities without getting 
burned. The Swedish counter-espionage was on their side fully occupied with him and 
his colleagues. In this, they had to develop and test new methods when it came to 
surveillance, infiltration, phone interception and mail control. These experiences later 
became very important and the methods were widely implemented during the late 
1900’s when the Swedish counter-espionage met the threats of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that Tennant seems to fit exceptionally well into his 
contemporary template of the modern and ideal spy with high morale, good judgment 
and an ability both to inspire collaboration and lead others and to bluff and mislead55. 
The alleged importance of these masculine behavioral dimensions of espionage is also 
emphasized in the contemporary instructions for S.O.E.-agents: How to Be a Spy. But 
in relation to that, Tennant differed obviously in his performance and behavior: «Be 
inconspicuous. Avoid all limelight by being an ‘average’ citizen in appearance (height, 
clothes) and conduct (drink, women)»56. On the contrary, Tennant sought the limelight 
and was anything else but an «average» and mediocre “Karlsson”. 
World War II created new transnational intelligence and espionage alliances that 
played a significant role during the rest of the 1900s and the Cold War57. But we still 
know very little about this. In Sweden, the detailed traces of S.O.E.’s and Peter 
Tennant’s activities seem to be fairly well cleaned out from the national archives. For, 
in the aftermath there were no general or specific interests at all to investigate this. 
Tennant was actually one of the moral and energetic heroes of the war and the 
reconciliation in Sweden was about other circumstances. This is also why the sabotages 
in Krylbo and at Hårsfjärden have been historically named as «catastrophes» and 
«accidents». Thus, something inexplicable that according to the official historical 
narrative of Sweden during World War II only just happened. But nothing is 
inexplicable and nothing just happens. Peter Tennant knew this certainly well when he 
gave the mysterious briefcase to K.E.G.J. the late evening in April 1943, in Stockholm. 
What it contained, we however know now. 
                                                 
55 FARAGO, Ladislas, War of Wits, cit., pp. 187-188. 
56 RIGDEN, Denis, How To Be A Spy, cit., p. 39. 
57 JEFFREYS-JONES, Rhodri, In Spies We Trust. The Story of Western Intelligence, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 94. RICHELSON, Jeffrey T, A Century of Spies. Intelligence in 
the Twentieth Century, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 215-217. 
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